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Reading Early Colonial Legal History as
Bob Gordon's Student
Claire Priest"
Commenting on Bob Gordon's early work is a humbling experience that
might compare to a composer commenting on early Beethoven or a painter on
early Michelangelo. The eloquence of Gordon's writing is unparalleled. It is an
absolute delight to read and enjoy every turn of phrase. Gordon perfectly
describes what others can only grasp at.
My comments focus on the first chapter of Taming the Past, which consists
of a classic essay published in 1975 describing the dominant body of legal
history as being overly "internal" in its perspective.1 As Gordon highlighted,
legal historians often presented the legal order as operating autonomously, in
isolation from major social and economic events as well as from societal power
dynamics, and were overly focused on "courts, equitable maxims, [and] motions
for summary judgment."2 The chapter presents a wonderful critique of an
earlier historiography.
Much of the chapter appraises the state of colonial legal history, a main
interest of the field of legal history at the time. Rather than analyzing the most
extreme of the scholars taking the internal view, these comments focus on the
work of a number of legal historians whom Gordon identifies as writing with
an awareness that law was not primarily shaped by "the logic of an internal
dynamic, independently of surrounding political, social, and economic
conditions," but whose work, even so, "did not bring about any very substantial
redefinition of the field of legal history."3
Herbert Johnson's historiographical essay, cited by Gordon, provides a
useful frame for understanding the large questions motivating the legal
Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School.
1. ROBERT W. GORDON, The Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, in
TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 17, 17 (2017).
2. See id. at 19.
3. See id. at 32.
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historians who were among the first to take an external view.4 Johnson
describes the field of legal history as divided according to an ideological debate
between Frederick Jackson Turner and Perry Miller.5 Turner's frontier thesis
put forward the idea that democracy had its origins in the egalitarianism, the
lack of high culture, and the violence of the frontier. Paul Samuel Reinsch, who
followed Turner in his account of legal history, characterized the colonists as
codifying law and as adopting "the essential elements of law for the guidance of
the colonists who had taken up their abode in a wilderness without books or
facilities for legal study" and who "establish[ed] rules dictated by their special
polity or by the conditions of primitive and simple life in which they found
themselves."6 As Gordon and Johnson emphasize, Reinsch's conclusions were
discredited, but Johnson views the Turnerian tradition in far more expansive
terms and as having far greater impact on the field.7 To Johnson, Turnerian
scholarship recognized strong geographical factors, density of population,
landholding patterns, and family structure as directly affecting law, in many
ways anticipating more modern law and society approaches.8
The Turnerian approach might be said to be in conflict with a competing
school, reflected in George Lee Haskins's Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts.9 Haskins sees himself as a follower of Perry Miller.10 In contrast
to the frontier thesis, to Haskins, the colonial legal tradition began in religious,
intellectual thought carried out by highly intelligent educated elites, people
who were "persons of wealth and ability, brought together by the ties of
marriage and friendship and by a sense of common purpose."1 The book
describes the colonial legal system, in its every detail, as the perfect
4. Herbert Alan Johnson, American Colonial Legal History: A Historiographical Interpretation,
in PERSPECTIVES ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RICHARD B. MORRIS
250 (Alden T. Vaughan & George Athan Billias eds., 1973); see also GORDON, supra note 1,
at 20 n.6 (citing Johnson's essay).
5. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 251, 273.
6. Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in
1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 410, 414 (Ass'n of Am. Law
Sch. ed., 1907).
7. See GORDON, supra note 1, at 29-30, 30 n.34; Johnson, supra note 4, at 251-52.
8. SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 251-56.
9. GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN
TRADITION AND DESIGN (1960).
10. See, e.g., id. at ix (referring to the early decades of the Massachusetts Bay Colony as "the
formative years during which, under the pervasive influence of Puritan doctrine, and
with virtually no outside interference, the structure of the civil government took
shape and was completed"). This reference alludes to, among others, PERRY MILLER,
THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1939), and PERRY MILLER,
ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956).
11. See HASKINS, supra note 9, at 12.
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manifestation of the elite Puritan leaders' divine mission.12 Democracy sprung
out of new immigrants' and a new generation's rebellion against the Puritan
leaders' authoritarianism, leading to codification as a buffer against religious
repression.
Reading these works after the passage of many decades, and after the field
has been transformed by the tremendous impact of the scholarship of Gordon
and other great scholars of our time, one becomes aware of a paradox in the
critique of internal history. In 1975, Gordon suggested that the failure of people
like Haskins "to develop an extensive external historiography" did not "stem
from pragmatic thinking" but "from loss of nerve in the face of the
implications of that thinking."'3 From the perspective of 2018, the greatest
weakness of the works appears to be not a loss of nerve but that the scholars
were operating according to ideological and political values that have
subsequently been rejected. The works of Haskins that fall more closely to the
"internal" typology might actually enjoy greater longevity because they
include less jarring editorialization and more doctrinal "facts" that are still
valuable.14
Haskins admits that the Puritan leaders were authoritarian, but he defends
their worldview and their actions as consistent with an admirable goal of social
stability. In one section Haskins seemingly endorses Puritan punishment and
the social hierarchy. Under the Body of Liberties a "true gentleman" was
generally not to be punished by whipping, unlike other members of the
society.i1 Haskins provides some defense for the immunity of gentlemen when,
in describing the "lower" class, Haskins notes that "[t]heir low standard of
living tended to promote both criminality and civic irresponsibility."16
Similarly, servants' "status and the degree of control exercised over them
tended to encourage irresponsibility and criminality."' 7 And again, with regard
to servants in permanent bondage, Haskins states: "Most of them were
household servants and farm hands, and, like bonded servants, they appear to
have been prone to criminality."18 Haskins's presumptions of criminality
implicitly justify some degree of severity in the Puritan criminal code.
12. See id. at 43-47.
13. See GORDON, supra note 1, at 35.
14. For two examples, see George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the
American Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280 (1942); and George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of the
Recording System in Massachusetts, 21 B.U. L. REv. 281 (1941).
15. See HASKINS, supra note 9, at 99 (quoting MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES of 1641, § 43).
16. See id. at 100.
17. See id. at 100-01.
18. See id.
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In another notable example, Haskins writes that "the death penalty for
adultery reflected not only biblical influence but the Puritan view that the
family was the cornerstone of church and commonwealth."19 From a modern
view, the death penalty seems a rather severe way to support families.
To offer a third example, Haskins's dogged insistence on interpreting all
colonial law through the lens of a peaceable kingdom-like approach informs
his analysis of Puritan debtor-creditor law. He notes that much of the law was
pro-creditor, even making land attachable for debts.20 Yet he also mentions
that in the downturn of 1640, a law was enacted allowing debtors to repay their
debts in goods.21 Without inquiry into the possible economic inequalities at
play, Haskins concludes that the debtor-creditor law reflected "the colonists'
view of their mission as an undertaking that required the effort and
cooperation of the whole community, committed to bearing one another's
burdens."22
Haskins later emphasizes that the. Puritans did not actually impose their
most draconian punishments, but the point is that Haskins's work fails to
incorporate values accepted in the civil rights era that throw into doubt earlier
justifications of class, race, and gender subjugation. By way of contrast, E.P.
Thompson's analysis, in Whigs and Hunters, of England's late eighteenth
century Black Act, which imposed the death penalty for certain property
offenses, reveals the law to reflect deep power imbalances within the society
and a desire for social control on the part of the elites.23 Haskins is a far cry
from Thompson and thus jarring to read. This relates to Gordon's essay in the
following way: From the vantage point of 2018, the more narrow, doctrinally
oriented scholarship of Haskins and the internalists may enjoy greater
longevity due to the absence of commentary.
Which leads me to think that the internal-external divide may today-
although not when Gordon wrote the chapter-ultimately be less important
than a shared set of values, and particularly the legacy of the civil rights
movement and that of scholars taking egalitarianism seriously. It is striking
that as Haskins was writing, David Brion Davis was claiming a serious
intellectual tradition for the study of slavery.24 Miller's greatest student,
Edmund Morgan, shattered existing conceptions of colonial society and
19. Id. at 149.
20. See id. at 215-17.
21. See id. at 215, 218.
22. Id. at 219.
23. See generally E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
(1975).
24. See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE, at vii-viii
(1966).
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colonial legal history in American Slavery, American Freedom.25 Their works
reflect more modern values and are still foundational to the field of history.
The field of legal history has flourished since the 1970s because of the
people who mentored Gordon and then because of Gordon himself. Gordon
has a truly brilliant mind. Part of the brilliance stems from his sensitivity to
details, nuances, and subtleties that escape even the most esteemed scholars.
Gordon examines historical evidence as well as current scholarship with the
bent of an anthropologist. He absorbs massive quantities of information and
perfectly contextualizes the information with an understanding of the authors'
assumptions, predispositions, and cultural frames. Works like Critical Legal
Histories and Historicism in Legal Scholarship utterly transformed the field of
legal history by laying bare the assumptions underlying the foundational
works within legal history and related disciplines.26
In Critical Legal Histories, the dominant assumption Gordon critiques is
functionalism, the idea that law and society are harmoniously intertwined in a
process of development.27 As Gordon explains, functionalism assumes that law
responds to the inherent needs of a society.28 Courts and legislatures fulfill an
institutional role of ensuring that the law keeps pace with societal transfor-
mation.29 Legal evolution occurs in response to changing social conditions.30
To a scholar writing legal history, a functional account is an easy way of
dealing with the thorny issue of causation. Describing law and legal evolution
as responses to societal needs is an easy crutch. Far harder is what Gordon
seeks: to describe legal change through the lens of actual agents of change and
their interests and to expose the interests served by legal rules and legal
evolution.3 1 Gordon's critique of functionalism is a call for historians to reach a
higher plane of nuance, to focus more readily on individuals as actors in
history with complex motivations, to examine more carefully who shapes law,
and to understand law's social and economic effects.
Gordon's prowess is in the details. His work is riveting because each
sentence, each turn of phrase, and each example from the sources holds a
powerful gem of information within a strikingly brilliant manner of
25. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
26. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) [hereinafter
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories]; Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE Lj. 1017 (1981).
27. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 26, at 58-61.
28. See id. at 63-64.
29. See id. at 64-65.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 69-71.
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expression. His prose exhibits an unmatched clarity of thought and command
of language. This clarity, combined with his uncanny sensitivity and analytic
rigor, makes his work timeless. He has truly written for the ages. Some of my
favorite works in Gordon's scholarship are review essays such as E.P.
Thompson's Legacies and Hayek and Cooter on Custom and Reason.32 Gordon is
always pitch-perfect in his ability to describe bodies of scholarship, their
importance, and the animating questions that propel them forward. These
works also reveal his preference for historical scholarship grounded in detail
and focused on individuals as agents of change.
Gordon's own historical works are triumphant accomplishments. His
methodology is as rigorous as it gets. His ability to present analytically cogent
descriptions of highly complex people and events is unparalleled. Paradoxical
Property provides the best description of the complex interface between
property law and the industrializing economy of the eighteenth century,
debunking the conception of absolute dominion in property law in the
process.33 His broader project on the history of the legal profession is already
one of the great classics in legal history. His knowledge of the field is boundless
and his writing masterful. Legal history simply does not get any better than at
the hands of Bob Gordon.
But to his credit, Gordon has gone furthest in entirely transforming the
field of legal history by his unfailingly generous mentoring of a generation of
students. At Yale, Gordon spent hours every week talking to students about the
students' interests, encouraging students to take new paths, allowing them the
freedom to hunt for gems both within thick fields such as constitutional law
and within thinner fields. Gordon is the best-read person I have ever met and
therefore serves as an encyclopedic resource on practically any topic. Every
one of us who became close to Gordon was inspired by him and revered him as
a scholar and mentor. His sensitivity to nuance pushed us to be far better
scholars than we would have been without his discerning gaze. Gordon showed
us the way to be free of older traditional ideas and, in a defining moment for
the field of legal history, taught us to ask our own questions. In one of the great
contingencies of the legal academy, Gordon's inspiring presence and
mentorship has been central to the turn toward legal history that is so apparent
in the upper tier of law schools today.
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32. Robert W. Gordon, Tribute, E.P. Thompson's Legacies, 82 GEo. L.J. 2005 (1994); Robert
W. Gordon, Hayek and Cooter on Custom and Reason, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 453 (1994).
33. See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 95, 95-96, 107-08 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).
